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Should You Pay a Ransomware Demand? Can Ransomware-Encrypted Files Be Recovered Without Paying? A Complete Ransomware Recovery Guide

A ransomware attack creates one of the most difficult decisions an individual or organization can face during a cybersecurity incident: Should we pay the ran...

Bison Technical Team Enterprise IT specialists

Updated 23 Aug 2026 16 min read 0 total views

A ransomware attack creates one of the most difficult decisions an individual or organization can face during a cybersecurity incident:

Should we pay the ransom, or should we attempt to recover the data ourselves?

A second question immediately follows:

Can ransomware-encrypted files actually be recovered without paying the attackers?

The answer to the second question is sometimes yes. Recovery may be possible through clean backups, snapshots, ransomware-specific decryptors, recovered encryption keys, unaffected replicas, cloud version history, forensic recovery techniques, or other sources of the original data.

Paying the ransom, however, should generally not be considered the first recovery strategy. The FBI states that it does not support paying ransomware demands because payment does not guarantee data recovery and encourages the ransomware ecosystem.

This article explains the technical and operational considerations involved in making that decision and the recovery methods that should be investigated before payment is even considered.

1. What Happens During a Ransomware Attack?

Ransomware is malicious software or attacker-controlled activity designed to deny access to systems or data and demand payment for restoration.

Modern ransomware incidents often involve considerably more than simply encrypting files.

An attacker may:

Gain initial access to a workstation or server.
Steal administrator credentials.
Perform network reconnaissance.
Move laterally between computers.
Compromise Active Directory or privileged accounts.
Disable endpoint protection.
Delete or damage backups.
Delete Volume Shadow Copies.
Exfiltrate confidential information.
Encrypt servers, workstations and network shares.
Leave ransom notes.
Threaten to publish stolen information.

Therefore, decrypting files does not necessarily mean the incident has been resolved.

An organization must determine how the attackers entered the environment and whether persistence mechanisms, stolen credentials or other malware remain.

2. Should You Pay a Ransomware Demand?

Generally, ransomware payment should be avoided where practical.

The FBI explicitly states that it does not support paying ransom. One major reason is simple: payment does not guarantee that the victim will receive usable data back.

Attackers are criminals, not legitimate service providers operating under enforceable contracts.

Even after receiving payment, they may:

Never provide a decryption key.
Provide a key that does not work.
Supply a poorly designed decryptor.
Decrypt only some files.
Demand additional payment.
Sell or publish stolen information anyway.
Leave malware or backdoors inside the network.
Attack the organization again later.

The FBI has also warned that paying a ransom does not necessarily prevent stolen data from subsequently being leaked.

3. Why Paying Ransomware Is Risky

No Guarantee of File Recovery

Perhaps the biggest misconception is:

"If we pay, we will get our files back."

There is no technical guarantee of this.

The ransomware operator may disappear, the infrastructure may be unavailable, the encryption implementation may be defective, or the decryptor may fail.

Some ransomware can even corrupt files during encryption.

If corruption occurred before or during encryption, possession of the correct cryptographic key may still not restore every file.

4. A Decryption Key Is Not the Same as Complete Recovery

Suppose an organization pays the ransom and receives a working decryptor.

That still does not mean the environment is safe.

The attacker may have:

Created additional administrator accounts.
Installed remote-access tools.
Created scheduled tasks.
Installed services.
Stolen passwords.
Extracted browser credentials.
Stolen VPN credentials.
Compromised domain administrator accounts.
Installed additional malware.
Exfiltrated databases.
Stolen customer information.

Therefore:

Decryption restores data accessibility. Incident recovery restores trust in the environment.

They are two different processes.

5. Payment Can Encourage Additional Ransomware

Successful ransomware payments demonstrate that extortion can be profitable.

The FBI notes that paying ransomware encourages perpetrators to target additional victims and creates incentives for other criminals to participate.

For organizations, payment can therefore have consequences beyond the immediate technical recovery decision.

6. Investigate Legal and Regulatory Restrictions Before Any Payment

Organizations should never assume that making a ransomware payment is simply an IT decision.

Depending on the country, organization, attacker and payment destination, legal, regulatory, sanctions, insurance and reporting requirements may apply.

Before any payment is considered, organizations should consult appropriate:

Legal counsel
Cybersecurity incident-response professionals
Law-enforcement authorities
Cyber-insurance providers
Regulatory/compliance teams
Financial institutions where applicable

Do not transfer cryptocurrency simply because a ransom note contains payment instructions.

7. Can Ransomware-Encrypted Files Be Recovered Without Paying?

Yes, in some ransomware incidents.

Whether recovery is possible depends heavily on:

The ransomware family
The ransomware version
Encryption implementation
Availability of backups
Backup integrity
Availability of snapshots
Whether encryption keys have become publicly available
Whether researchers have discovered weaknesses
Whether unaffected copies of the data exist

There is no universal ransomware decryption program.

8. Recovery Method 1: Restore from Clean Backups

A properly designed backup system is usually the strongest defense against ransomware encryption.

Possible backup sources include:

External backup drives
Backup servers
NAS backup repositories
Tape backups
Cloud backups
Immutable storage
Offline backups
Air-gapped backups
Replicated disaster-recovery systems

However, do not immediately connect a backup repository to an actively infected environment.

The ransomware may still be running.

9. Why Offline and Immutable Backups Are Important

Many ransomware operators deliberately search for backups before starting widespread encryption.

Attackers may attempt to:

Delete backup files.
Delete snapshots.
Disable backup software.
Remove retention points.
Encrypt NAS devices.
Compromise backup administrator accounts.
Delete cloud backups.

This is why organizations should maintain backup copies that cannot easily be modified by compromised production credentials.

10. The 3-2-1 Backup Principle

A traditional ransomware-resilient backup strategy starts with the 3-2-1 principle:

3 copies of important data

2 different storage types

1 copy stored offsite or isolated

Modern organizations often extend this concept by including immutable or offline copies.

For example:

Production Data
↓
Local Backup Repository
↓
Immutable Cloud Backup
↓
Offline/Isolated Recovery Copy

The exact architecture should be based on the organization's recovery-time and recovery-point requirements.

11. Recovery Method 2: Check for a Free Ransomware Decryptor

Security researchers, antivirus companies and law-enforcement organizations sometimes obtain ransomware encryption keys or discover weaknesses in ransomware encryption.

When this happens, free decryptors may become available.

One important resource is the No More Ransom project.

No More Ransom Decryption Tools

Its decryptor repository includes tools for numerous ransomware families.

However, a decryptor designed for one ransomware family must not be assumed to work against another.

12. Identify the Ransomware Variant Before Attempting Decryption

Before downloading any decryptor, determine which ransomware family caused the infection.

Useful evidence includes:

Ransom note filename
Ransom note contents
Encrypted file extension
Sample encrypted file
Attacker email address
Onion/Tor address
Cryptocurrency payment information
Malware sample
Security product detection
Incident-response logs

For example, files might change from:

accounts.xlsx

to:

accounts.xlsx.[attacker-ID].locked

The extension can provide a clue, but it should not be considered definitive proof because different ransomware families can use similar extensions.

13. Preserve Encrypted Files Before Experimenting

Do not start modifying all encrypted files while testing random recovery programs.

Preserve copies of:

Several encrypted documents
Original ransom notes
Malware samples where safely available
System logs
Security logs
Firewall logs
EDR/antivirus detections
Relevant event logs

Most importantly, keep the encrypted data if storage capacity permits.

A decryptor may not exist today but could become available later.

The No More Ransom project, for example, maintains decryptors for numerous identified ransomware families.

14. Recovery Method 3: Windows Volume Shadow Copies

Windows can maintain previous versions of files using Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS).

Depending on configuration, recovery may sometimes be possible using:

Properties → Previous Versions

However, sophisticated ransomware frequently attempts to delete shadow copies before encrypting data.

Therefore, VSS should never be considered a substitute for a proper backup.

15. Recovery Method 4: Storage and Virtualization Snapshots

Enterprise infrastructure may contain recoverable snapshots even when individual Windows systems have been encrypted.

Examples can include:

Hypervisor snapshots
SAN snapshots
NAS snapshots
Cloud volume snapshots
Database snapshots
Replication checkpoints

Before restoring them, administrators must verify that the selected recovery point predates the compromise where practical.

A snapshot created after attackers established persistence could restore both the data and the compromise.

16. Recovery Method 5: Cloud File Version History

Organizations using cloud synchronization services may have earlier file versions.

Depending on the platform and retention configuration, administrators may be able to restore versions created before ransomware encryption.

This is particularly useful when ransomware encrypts locally synchronized folders and those encrypted versions subsequently synchronize to the cloud.

But synchronization itself is not backup.

If encrypted or deleted files synchronize successfully, the cloud copy may also be affected unless versioning, retention or separate backup exists.

17. Recovery Method 6: Recover Data from Unaffected Systems

Copies of important information may exist elsewhere.

Examples include:

Employee laptops
Email attachments
USB drives
Archived project folders
Remote offices
Branch servers
Exported reports
Database dumps
Old computers
Cloud storage
Customer/vendor systems

During recovery, organizations should inventory all potential data sources before assuming that ransom payment is the only option.

18. Recovery Method 7: Database-Level Recovery

Databases require special consideration.

For applications such as:

Accounting software
ERP systems
CRM systems
SQL Server
MySQL
PostgreSQL
Line-of-business applications

recovery may be possible from:

Full database backups
Differential backups
Transaction logs
Database replicas
Export files
Cloud database snapshots
Application-specific backup files

Database restoration should generally be performed by someone familiar with the affected application.

19. Can Data-Recovery Software Recover Ransomware Files?

Sometimes—but expectations should be realistic.

Ordinary deleted-file recovery software generally cannot break strong ransomware encryption.

However, recovery software may occasionally find deleted copies, temporary files or remnants of original data if ransomware created encrypted copies and deleted the originals rather than encrypting them in place.

Success depends on factors such as:

Filesystem behavior
SSD TRIM
Disk activity after infection
Ransomware implementation
Whether original sectors were overwritten

Do not install recovery software directly onto the affected disk if forensic recovery is important, because new writes can overwrite recoverable data.

20. Why You Should Not Rename Encrypted Files Randomly

Removing a ransomware extension usually does not decrypt anything.

For example:

Invoice.xlsx.locked

renamed to:

Invoice.xlsx

does not restore the original Excel document.

The underlying contents remain encrypted.

File extensions identify file types; they are not responsible for the encryption itself.

21. Do Not Format the Infected Computer Immediately

A common reaction is:

"Format everything immediately."

Formatting may eventually be appropriate, but evidence and recoverable information should first be considered.

Premature formatting could destroy:

Malware samples
Logs
Ransom notes
Recoverable deleted data
Encryption-related artifacts
Evidence needed for investigation

Organizations should preserve necessary evidence before rebuilding affected machines.

22. Immediate Actions After Discovering Ransomware

When ransomware is detected, containment is the priority.

Disconnect affected computers from the network.

Remove or disable:

Ethernet connectivity
Wi-Fi connectivity
VPN connections
Shared storage access

If encryption is actively spreading, rapid network isolation can help protect other systems.

Isolate affected servers.

Determine whether encryption is spreading across:

SMB shares
File servers
NAS devices
Application servers
Backup servers

Protect backups.

Prevent compromised accounts or infected systems from accessing backup infrastructure.

Preserve evidence.

Retain ransom notes, logs and representative encrypted files.

Activate incident response.

Organizations should involve appropriate IT, cybersecurity, management, legal, insurance and regulatory personnel as required.

23. Do Not Start Restoration While the Attacker Still Has Access

One of the most serious recovery mistakes is restoring backups before removing the attacker's access.

Imagine:

Attacker compromises administrator credentials
↓
Ransomware encrypts server
↓
Administrator restores server
↓
Attacker still has administrator credentials
↓
Attacker returns
↓
Server is encrypted again

Before full restoration, organizations should investigate and remediate the original access path.

24. Reset Compromised Credentials

Depending on the scope of compromise, credentials requiring rotation may include:

Domain Administrator passwords
Local Administrator passwords
Microsoft 365 accounts
Google Workspace accounts
VPN credentials
Firewall accounts
Backup administrator accounts
Hypervisor accounts
NAS accounts
Database credentials
Service accounts
Remote-access credentials

Password changes should be coordinated carefully during enterprise incident response because changing accounts in the wrong sequence can disrupt services.

25. Determine the Initial Attack Vector

Recovery is incomplete until the original vulnerability or access path has been addressed.

Common entry points include:

Phishing
Stolen credentials
Exposed Remote Desktop
Vulnerable VPN appliances
Unpatched servers
Malicious attachments
Compromised remote-management tools
Weak passwords
Credential reuse
Third-party compromise
Exploited internet-facing applications

The affected entry point should be remediated before returning systems to normal operation.

26. What If No Backup or Decryptor Exists?

This is the most difficult situation.

Possible options include:

Preserve the encrypted data.
Identify the exact ransomware family.
Search trusted decryptor repositories.
Contact professional incident-response specialists.
Investigate snapshots.
Check cloud version history.
Examine offline systems.
Search email and document repositories for copies.
Investigate database/application backups.
Consider forensic recovery.
Report the ransomware incident to the appropriate authorities.

Only after understanding these alternatives should management evaluate remaining business-continuity options.

27. What If the Ransomware Uses Strong Encryption?

Well-designed ransomware can use modern cryptographic algorithms that cannot realistically be defeated through brute-force password guessing.

If the encryption implementation is secure and the required private key is unavailable, directly cracking the encryption may be computationally impractical.

Recovery then depends on another route:

Backup → Snapshot → Version history → Decryptor → Recovered key → Alternate data source

This distinction is important.

"Recovering ransomware files" does not necessarily mean "breaking the encryption."

Most successful recovery is accomplished by obtaining the data from another trusted source.

28. What Is Double-Extortion Ransomware?

Modern ransomware frequently combines encryption with data theft.

The attacker may:

Steal confidential data.
Encrypt the victim's systems.
Demand payment for decryption.
Threaten to publish the stolen data.

This is called double extortion.

Consequently, restoring every file from backup does not automatically resolve the breach.

Organizations must still investigate whether sensitive information was exfiltrated.

29. Backup Recovery Does Not Eliminate Data-Breach Concerns

Consider this scenario:

The company has excellent immutable backups.

Ransomware encrypts 20 servers.

All servers are restored successfully.

Operational recovery may be excellent—but attackers might still have stolen:

Customer records
Employee records
Financial information
Passwords
Contracts
Intellectual property

The organization must therefore treat ransomware as a potential security breach, not merely a backup problem.

30. Recommended Ransomware Recovery Workflow

A structured recovery process might look like:

Detection

↓

Network Isolation

↓

Preserve Evidence

↓

Identify Affected Systems

↓

Protect Backups

↓

Determine Ransomware Variant

↓

Investigate Data Exfiltration

↓

Identify Initial Entry Point

↓

Remove Persistence and Malware

↓

Reset Compromised Credentials

↓

Check Free Decryptors

↓

Verify Clean Backups/Snapshots

↓

Rebuild Systems Where Necessary

↓

Restore Data

↓

Patch Vulnerabilities

↓

Validate Security

↓

Reconnect Systems Gradually

↓

Enhanced Monitoring

This approach is significantly safer than simply decrypting files and reconnecting machines.

31. Best Defense: Prepare Before Ransomware Happens

Organizations should implement multiple defensive layers.

Recommended controls include:

Regular backups
Immutable/offline backups
Tested disaster recovery
MFA
Endpoint detection and response
Antivirus/anti-malware protection
Email security
Network segmentation
Least-privilege access
Restricted administrator accounts
Patch management
Vulnerability management
Secure remote access
Logging and monitoring
User security awareness
Incident-response procedures

No individual security product provides complete ransomware protection.

32. Test Your Backups

A backup that has never been restored is an assumption, not a proven recovery mechanism.

Organizations should periodically test:

Individual file recovery
Database recovery
Complete server recovery
Virtual-machine recovery
Bare-metal recovery
Cloud recovery
Recovery after simulated ransomware

Record both:

RPO — Recovery Point Objective

How much recent data can the organization afford to lose?

and

RTO — Recovery Time Objective

How long can the organization operate without the affected system?

33. Final Recommendation

When ransomware strikes, do not assume paying the ransom is the fastest or safest solution.

Instead:

Contain the infection → Preserve evidence → Protect backups → Identify the ransomware → Investigate decryptors → Check backups and snapshots → Determine the compromise scope → Remove attacker access → Restore clean systems → Monitor carefully.

The FBI does not support paying ransomware demands because payment does not guarantee recovery and contributes to continued ransomware activity.

At the same time, every ransomware incident is different. Organizations facing serious operational, legal or safety consequences should involve qualified incident-response, legal, insurance and law-enforcement resources before making irreversible decisions.

Most importantly, encrypted files should not automatically be considered permanently lost.

Free decryptors exist for many ransomware families, and the No More Ransom project maintains a substantial collection of ransomware-specific decryption tools.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

1. Should I pay a ransomware demand?

Generally, payment should not be the first recovery option. The FBI does not support paying ransomware demands because there is no guarantee that payment will result in successful data recovery.

2. Will ransomware attackers definitely decrypt my files if I pay?

No. There is no enforceable guarantee that attackers will provide a working key or decryptor.

3. Can ransomware files be recovered without paying?

Yes, depending on the incident. Recovery may be possible through backups, snapshots, cloud version history, free decryptors or alternate copies of the data.

4. Are free ransomware decryptors available?

Yes. Security organizations have developed decryptors for numerous ransomware families. The No More Ransom project maintains a searchable collection.

5. Can every ransomware variant be decrypted for free?

No. Some ransomware uses correctly implemented strong encryption for which no publicly available key or cryptographic weakness exists.

6. Can antivirus software decrypt ransomware files?

Usually antivirus software's primary role is detecting and removing malware. Some security vendors separately provide ransomware-specific decryptors.

7. Should I remove ransomware before using a decryptor?

Yes. The No More Ransom project specifically warns that malware should be removed before starting decryption, otherwise the system may encrypt files again.

8. Can ransomware encrypt backup files?

Yes. Backups accessible from compromised systems or accounts can potentially be encrypted or deleted.

9. Can ransomware encrypt NAS drives?

Yes. Network-accessible storage can be affected when ransomware or attackers have sufficient access.

10. Can ransomware encrypt mapped network drives?

Yes. Network shares accessible to the compromised account can potentially be encrypted.

11. Can ransomware affect cloud-synchronized folders?

Yes. Locally encrypted files may synchronize to cloud storage. Version history or backup may provide recovery options depending on the service and configuration.

12. Can Windows Previous Versions recover ransomware files?

Sometimes. Recovery may be possible if usable Volume Shadow Copies remain, but ransomware frequently attempts to delete them.

13. Can renaming an encrypted file fix it?

No. Removing .locked, .encrypted or another ransomware-added extension does not decrypt the contents.

14. Should I delete encrypted files?

Usually not immediately. Preserve encrypted data until recovery and investigation options have been evaluated.

15. Could a decryptor become available later?

Yes. Researchers or law enforcement may later obtain keys or discover vulnerabilities in a ransomware family's encryption implementation.

16. Should I format the ransomware-infected computer?

A clean rebuild may ultimately be advisable, but evidence and potentially recoverable data should first be preserved where appropriate.

17. Can ransomware come back after restoring a backup?

Yes. If the original access method, compromised credentials or attacker persistence remains, systems can potentially be compromised again.

18. Is restoring from backup enough after ransomware?

Not necessarily. The organization should investigate how attackers entered, what systems were compromised and whether data was stolen.

19. What is double-extortion ransomware?

It is an attack where criminals steal information as well as encrypt systems, then threaten to publish the stolen information if payment is not made.

20. Does paying guarantee that stolen information will be deleted?

No. The FBI has specifically warned that payment does not necessarily prevent stolen information from ultimately being leaked.

21. What should I do first when ransomware is detected?

Immediately focus on containment: isolate affected systems from networks and shared resources, protect backups, preserve evidence and activate the incident-response process.

22. Should I immediately connect my backup drive and restore everything?

No. First ensure that active ransomware or attacker access cannot compromise the backup or restored systems.

23. Can ransomware encrypt an entire Windows Server?

Ransomware can encrypt accessible files on Windows Server systems and may affect applications, databases and network shares depending on permissions and attack scope.

24. What is the best protection against ransomware data loss?

A combination of strong security controls and tested, isolated or immutable backups provides much stronger resilience than relying on any single antivirus product.

25. Where can I check for legitimate ransomware decryptors?

A major trusted resource is the No More Ransom project's decryption-tool repository.

Important Disclaimer

This article is provided for general cybersecurity education and awareness purposes only. Ransomware incidents can involve legal, regulatory, financial, privacy, insurance and law-enforcement considerations that vary by jurisdiction and circumstances.

Organizations dealing with an active ransomware incident should consider consulting qualified cybersecurity incident-response professionals, legal counsel, their cyber-insurance provider and relevant authorities before making decisions regarding ransom payments, system destruction, evidence handling or data-breach notifications.